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ABSTRACT
A flight demonstration was conducted to address airport
surface movement area capacity issues by providing pilots
with enhanced situational awareness information. The
demonstration showed an integration of several
technologies to government and industry representatives.
These technologies consisted of an electronic moving map
display in the cockpit, a Differential Global Positioning
System (DGPS) receiver, a high speed VHP data link, an
ASDE-3 radar, and the Airport Movement Area Safety
System (AMASS). Aircraft identification was presented
to an air traffic controller on AMASS. The onboard
electronic map included the display of taxi routes, hold
instructions, and clearances, which were sent to the
aircraft via data link by the controller. The map also
displayed the positions of other traffic and warning
information, which were sent to the aircraft automatically
from the ASDE-3/AMASS system. This paper describes
the flight demonstration in detail, along with preliminary
results.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. aviation industry is investing $6 billion over 20
years to increase airport capacity; however, there is a gap
between the industry's desired capacity and the ability of
the National Airspace System to handle the increased air
traffic. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
reported that currently 23 of the largest U.S. airports
experience more than 20,000 hours of delays each year,
and that by the year 2000,40 major airports are likely to
be experiencing delays of this magnitude [1].
Furthermore, these air traffic delays were estimated to cost
$3 billion for airline operations and $6 billion for
passenger delays in 1990. These costs are projected to
increase 50 percent in 10 years based on current trends.
Action must be taken to safely increase airport capacity of
existing airport facilities while reducing controller and
pilot workload. The FAA plans to address these concerns
by providing air traffic control, the airlines, and airfield
management with positive identification of surface targets
on the movement area; providing pilots with airfield safety
alerts; providing controllers with automated warnings of
potential and actual runway incursions; providing a
surface traffic planning capability; and providing an
automated method of sending instructions, such as taxi
route clearances, to aircraft1
Similarly, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA) Terminal Area Productivity
(TAP) Program is focused on providing technology and
operating procedures for safely achieving clear-weather
capacity in instrument-weather conditions. In cooperation
with the FAA, NASA's approach is to develop and
demonstrate airborne and ground technology and
procedures to safely reduce aircraft spacing in the terminal
area, enhance air traffic management, reduce controller
workload, improve low visibility landing and surface
operations, and integrate aircraft and air traffic systems.
This paper describes a flight demonstration that was
conducted by the NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC)
which addressed many of the FAA and TAP program
issues.
FLIGHT DEMONSTRATION
The flight demonstration was part of the NASA TAP Low
Visibility Landing and Surface Operations (LVLASO)
Program. The demonstration was conducted in
conjunction with industry partners from Westinghouse
Norden Systems and ARINC, Incorporated. The goals of
the testing were (1) to demonstrate an integrated system
that would provide the pilot with enhanced situational
awareness information to safely increase the traffic
capacity on the airport surface movement area and (2) to
identify system integration issues. The demonstration was
conducted at the Atlantic City International (ACY) airport
in June 1995 with the cooperation of the FAA Technical
Center.
Demonstration Technologies
The demonstration showed an integration of technologies
developed by each of the partners as depicted in figure 1.
The following sections describe these technologies in
detail.
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Figure 1. Flight demonstration schematic.
Transport Systems Research Vehicle -- The Transport
Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV), a modified Boeing
737-130, is a NASA LaRC research aircraft [2]. The
TSRV has two flight decks. The forward flight deck is a
conventional Boeing 737 cockpit that provides operational
suppon and safety backup. The "all-glass" research flight
deck, located in the aircraft cabin, can be readily
reconfigured to support research programs.
Ground Station ~ The personal computer based ground
station served as a message routing center among the
various demonstration subsystems. The station included a
Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and
communication radio for the data link of messages to/from
the TSRV. The uplinked messages included GPS
corrections, controller instructions, ASDE-3 traffic
positions, and AMASS hold warnings. The downlinked
messages included TSRV position reports and pilot
acknowledgment of controller instructions.
Differential Global Positioning System - DGPS was
used to determine the location of the TSRV. A NASA
provided GPS receiver was located onboard the aircraft
This receiver was updated with differential corrections
generated by the ARINC provided GPS receiver located at
the ground station.
An ARINC provided GPS receiver was also located
onboard the TSRV. This GPS position data was
differentially corrected as well and the resulting DGPS
position was transmitted to the ground station in the form
of high precision Automatic Dependent Surveillance
(ADS) reports.
Data Link -- The high speed bi-directional VHF data link
transmitted data at 31,500 bits per second between the
TSRV and ground station. The radios used were software
programmable and operated in the frequency band
118.000 through 136.975 MHz at a power output of about
20 watts. This was the world's first demonstration of the
new high speed VHF Digital Link (VDL) waveform as
defined in section 2 of [3].
ASDE-3 radar -- The ASDE-3 [4] is a high resolution
airport ground mapping radar with maximum weather
penetration capability. It scans, tracks, and identifies
airport surface targets once every second. Highly
integrated computer technology provides accurate runway
surface maps, multiple windowing capabilities, and
magnification of designated areas. Controllers use ASDE-
3 to monitor airport activity.
AMASS -- AMASS [5] was designed under FAA
sponsorship to enhance the surveillance and collision
avoidance capabilities of the ASDE-3 radar. AMASS
provides controllers with automatic conflict warnings and
alerts to help prevent collisions and other runway and
taxiway accidents. A research and development version of
AMASS was used for the demonstration.
Controller Interface •- An interface was developed to
enable the simulation ground controller to send taxi routes,
hold short instructions, and clearances via data link to the
TSRV for display on the electronic map. The interface
was menu driven.
Electronic Moving Map ~ An electronic moving map
(figure 2) was developed and evaluated in simulator
studies [6] at NASA LaRC. For the demonstration, the
Figure 2. Electronic moving map display.
map was generated by a graphics workstation and
displayed on a liquid crystal flat panel that had a 640 by
480 pixel resolution and display dimensions of 8.5 inches
by 6.5 inches. The pilot interacted with the moving map
through bezel switches located on each side of the display.
The available functions included acknowledging the taxi
route, acknowledging hold short commands, zoom in/out,
show/hide other traffic, show/hide five second position
prediction indicator, track/north up mode, display an insert
containing the airport, and Air Traffic Control (ATC)
message recall. Additionally, the map could be set at a
level such that navigational aids within a 25 mile radius of
the airport were visible.
Figure 2 shows the major components of the moving map.
The aircraft locator was updated at 20 HZ from a blending
of the position received from the TSRV's Inertial
Reference System (IRS) and from the differentially
corrected NASA provided GPS receiver onboard the
aircraft.
Warning information that indicated occupied runways
(AMASS hold bars) and positions of other traffic was
transmitted to the TSRV via data link automatically from
AMASS for display on the moving map. The positions of
other traffic were obtained from the ASDE-3 radar via the
data link.
The cleared taxi route, modified routes, and hold short
clearances were sent to the TSRV by the simulation
ground controller via data link. For this demonstration, the
routes and modified routes were scripted for each run.
Demonstration Description
Scenario -- During a demonstration session, the TSRV
followed a departure and arrival taxi route that included a
real-time modification to the route. Government and
industry representatives observed the taxi run from a
building adjacent to the old ACY control tower. This
building also housed all ground equipment and was the
base of operation for the simulation ground controller.
At all times during the demonstration, the TSRV was
under ACY air traffic control. The safety pilot in the
forward flight deck was in contact with the control tower.
The simulation controller monitored ACY control to
determine what information to transmit to the aircraft
through the menu driven interface. The simulation
controller communicated with the research pilot in the
research flight deck on the TSRV strictly bv data link and
with the researchers on the TSRV by voice. The research
pilot was not monitoring the tower. To lessen the burden
on the tower, ACY asked that the safety pilot request the
desired route and holds before each run. The tower then
repeated the command. At that point, the simulation
controller sent the appropriate route and hold short
information to the TSRV for acknowledgment by the
research pilot. When a modification to the route was
desired, the safety pilot requested the desired change while
at a hold bar or when taxiing along the route, the tower
then broadcast the command, and the simulation controller
sent the route change to the TSRV. On departure, the route
request was made at the gate (which was the FAA ramp in
this case). Upon arrival, the request was made after exit
from the runway.
The FAA Technical Center mounted three cameras on the
ASDE-3 radar tower. These images were displayed at the
ground site so the simulation controller could view the
airport since the movement area was not visible from that
location.
Additionally, the identification of the TSRV was shown
on the controller's AMASS display next to the aircraft's
symbol. AMASS used the ADS position report to fuse the
identification with the appropriate ASDE-3 radar track.
For this flight demonstration, the electronic moving map
was located in the research flight deck of the TSRV. The
safety pilot in the forward flight deck was controlling the
aircraft during taxi because the research flight deck did not
have a steering tiller. At all times, the safety pilot was to
taxi the aircraft on the centerlines. The research pilot
verbally relayed routing and situation information
obtained from the electronic map to the safety pilot. The
situation information included status of the TSRV on the
taxi route (when turns were approaching, etc.). when holds
were approaching, and the location of relevant traffic. The
safety pilot was able to determine the effectiveness of the
map through the situation awareness information relayed
from the research pilot. The research pilot could also
determine any anomalies in the electronic map by viewing
how well the aircraft symbol followed the centerlines.
A video link was established between the TSRV and the
ground site. This enabled the simulation controller and
visitors to selectively view the electronic map image, tail
camera image, or research flight deck in real-time.
RESULTS
Although these flight trials were primarily aimed at
demonstrating the feasibility of integrating several
advanced technologies, they also provided an opportunity
to gather qualitative and quantitative real-time data.
Preliminary analysis of this data has revealed
characteristics about the performance of each technology
individually and the system as a whole.
Data Collection
During each flight (taxi out, takeoff acceleration, landing
deceleration, taxi in), data was recorded in three locations:
(1) at the ASDE/AMASS site; (2) at the ground station;
and (3) onboard the TSRV. All data was time-stamped to
allow for synchronization and analysis after the flights.
Data recorded at the ASDE/AMASS site included all
ASDE/AMASS data sent to the ground station (e.g. traffic
positions and AMASS hold bars), as well as the data
received from the ground station (e.g. ADS messages
downlinked from the aircraft). This data was recorded
every second.
Data recorded at the ground station included messages
sent to and received from the aircraft (e.g. DGPS
corrections, ADS messages, controller instructions, and
ASDE/AMASS data). This data was also recorded every
second.
Data was stored onboard the TSRV in three locations.
GPS-related information (e.g. satellites tracked, GPS time,
latitude/longitude, DGPS corrections, etc.) was stored in
the GPS receiver every second. The flight management
system recorded 80 aircraft state variables at 20 Hz (e.g.
ground speed, yaw rate, nosewheel position, braking force,
etc.) and also all the data received across the datalink.
Five video tapes were made during each flight These
recorded video from a tail camera, a nose camera, the
electronic map display, the rear flight deck cockpit, and
the flight instruments. An audio tape was made of the
conversations between the safety and research pilots; the
safety pilots and the control tower; the research pilot and
the researchers; and the researchers and the simulation
controller. Lastly, subjective comments were obtained
from the pilots, controllers, and visitors on the
effectiveness, content and operation of each subsystem.
Preliminary Analysis
The initial analysis has been focused on data availability,
integrity, and accuracy. Availability is important in an
operational environment because information must be
received in a timely manner both onboard the aircraft and
by the controller. Integrity ensures that the data received
has not been corrupted as it moves along its path.
Accuracy ensures that all target positions, including the
TSRV, are correct with respect to their true position on the
airport surface.
Accuracy
Table 1 lists the position accuracies obtained during
testing on June 27 and June 28. The "true" position of the
TSRV at all times was calculated using algorithms
developed at Ohio University. These algorithms can
process GPS data during post flight to determine position
within five centimeters (two inches) [7] [8].
The raw ASDE-3 track data received onboard was slightly
skewed from its location on the ASDE-3 display. This
probably resulted from the conversion process from the
ASDE's coordinate system (rho, theta) to the TSRV's
coordinate system (latitude, longitude). A rotation of 0.01
radians was added (during post-processing) to the radar
data received on the TSRV to minimize this skew. Had
time permitted, this could have easily been done during
testing at the ASDE site to eliminate this skew in real-
time.
This preliminary analysis of position accuracy reveals that
both sensors are adequate to allow pilots to observe
relative locations of other traffic on the airport surface;
Run
6/27 #1
6/27 #2
6/27 #3
6/27 #4
6/27 #5
6/27 #6
6/27 #7
6/28 #1
6/28 #2
6/28 #3
6/28 #4
Overall
DGPS
Mean
1.428'
0.981'
1.071'
2.124'
1.853'
2.468'
2.175'
2.320'
2.122'
2.400'
1.880'
1.893'
StdDev
0.872'
0.758'
0.710'
1.060'
0.680'
1.018'
0.860'
3.175'
1.175'
1.030'
1.070'
0.517'
ASDE-3
Mean
18.870*
19.271'
27.610'
24.630'
42.483'
30.134'
24.171'
45.177'
27.366'
20.680'
27.740'
28.012'
StdDev
12.450'
12.250'
18.919'
15.694'
33.221'
22.845'
16.207'
27.329'
13.451'
13.596'
15.912'
8.655'
Table 1. Position sensor accuracies for 6/27 and 6/28.
however, for navigation or guidance, only the EX3PS
sensor had sufficient accuracy.
Availability
Ideally, in an operational environment, data should be
available at all times both onboard the aircraft (e.g. traffic
position data, DGPS corrections, and controller
instructions) and on the ground (e.g. ADS messages and
pilot acknowledgments). Below is a preliminary analysis
of the uplinkcd data received onboard the TSRV during
testing. Analysis of the downlinked data is ongoing and
will not be presented herein.
Uplinkcd data consisted of the controller instructions,
AMASS hold bars, DGPS corrections, and traffic
positions. Instructions from the simulation ground
controller were always received in a timely manner by the
test pilot monitoring the cockpit map display. These
instructions included the taxi route, hold short instructions,
and clearances to proceed. Delays in issuing commands
would sometimes occur due to unfamiliarity with the user
interface at the controller workstation. However, once a
command was issued, its appearance on the cockpit
display was nearly immediate. Future work should
address developing a more user-friendly controller
interface.
To validate the uplink of AMASS hold bars, the TSRV
performed a high-speed taxi while on the runway surface.
By performing a takeoff abort in this fashion, the AMASS
hold bar function would be stimulated In the 11 runs
where this was attempted, the AMASS hold bars were
illuminated on the cockpit display 10 times. In each of
these occurrences, the bars appeared and disappeared
appropriately with respect the TSRV's location on the
runway. The one occurrence when the hold bars did not
illuminate suggested that the TSRV did not achieve the
necessary acceleration and velocity to be deemed a takeoff
(or landing) by the AMASS software.
DGPS corrections received onboard the TSRV were
usually received every second. However, sometimes the
rate slipped to every 3-5 seconds, and occasionally every
10-20 seconds. The important thing to note here is that
despite the occasional delay in receiving a correction, the
DGPS solution was maintained to within one meter. (See
Table 1) This is because corrections need not be updated
very frequently while moving slowly on the ground (e.g.
taxiing). It is apparent that an update rate of 3-15 seconds
would be sufficient for DGPS corrections while taxing on
an airport surface. The exact update rate that would be
sufficient to maintain accurate DGPS is dependent on the
Selective Availability (SA) component of the GPS system.
SA is currently controlled by the Department of Defense.
The availability of the ASDE-3 traffic data onboard the
TSRV is represented in Figure 3. For these tests, traffic
data was received every second 55% of the time.
Similarly, traffic data was received within two seconds
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Figure 3. Availability of traffic data onboard the TSRV versus delay (seconds).
ID
TSRV
4260048
4260107
4260192
4260063
Overall
ASDE-3
points
462
202
111
6
6
767
time (sec)
658
202
111
6
6
983
rate(sec/pt)
1.42
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.25
TSRV
points
302
127
96
3
0
528
time (sec)
657
200
135
4
0
996
rate(sec/pt)
2.17
1.57
1.41
1.33
NA
1.89
%Received
65.4
62.9
86.5
50.0
0.0
71.6
Table 2. Target track data (6/28 Run 4).
75% of the time. Finally, if five second delays can be
tolerated in receiving traffic data, it will be available 90%
of the time. Future studies should address how much
delay can be tolerated in receiving traffic data.
Integrity
Less than 1% of the messages received onboard the TSRV
were observed to be corrupted (and these were due to
format errors). However, one integrity issue observed was
the intermittent disappearance of target tracks onboard the
aircraft for short periods of time during specific runs.
Table 2 depicts target track data recorded at the radar site
and onboard the TSRV respectively for a run performed
on June 28. Note that vehicle 4260048 was tracked for
202 seconds by ASDE-3, however, the TSRV received
only 127 position updates during this time. At this point it
is not clear what caused this phenomena, however, it bears
directly on the target availability issue described above. It
is suspected that the cause is related to the method chosen
to package data and/or the priorities assigned to the
various message types prior to uplink.
Notice also in Table 2 (id 4260063 and 4260192) the
"ghost" targets. These are general radar disturbances
caused by multipath that must be considered in future
testing. Future work should also address developing
techniques to minimize the probability of tracking "ghost"
targets both on the AMASS display and on the aircraft
display.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The flight trials successfully demonstrated an integration
of current technologies that provided the pilot and
controller with situation awareness information that
promise to safely increasing traffic capacity on the airport
surface. Preliminary analysis shows that both DGPS and
ASDE-3 position data was adequate for pilot observation
of relative locations of airport traffic; however, DGPS was
required for navigation and guidance accuracy. Uplink
data delays of traffic position were generally within 5
seconds. Further study is required to determine safe delay
tolerances. Less than 1% of uplink messages were
observed to be corrupted. However, work is needed to
eliminate time gaps in receiving airport traffic data
onboard and the tracking of "ghost" targets. The results
from this test will be used as drivers (or lessons learned)
for subsequent flight testing that will occur over the next
several years.
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